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Introduction
The D.C. Historic Preservation Act1 prohibits owners of landmarks or property in historic
districts from altering, demolishing, subdividing, or beginning new construction on their property
without a permit. The Act accords great power to an agent of the Mayor of the District of
Columbia who has ultimate authority to grant or deny permits to demolish, alter, subdivide, or
allow new construction on historic landmarks and on properties within historic districts.2 The
Mayor’s Agent for Historic Preservation (Mayor’s Agent) is an administrative law judge (ALJ)
who is not required to have any expertise in historic preservation or land use.
The Act establishes a Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB) to designate
landmarks and historic districts and to make recommendations to the Mayor’s Agent in permit
decisions.3 The mayor appoints the members of the HPRB based on the members’ expertise in
preservation issues and their ability to reflect the geographic, racial, gender, and other
demographic characte ristics of the city. When it makes recommendations to the Mayor’s Agent,
the HPRB is considered solely an advisory body,4 and the Mayor’s Agent does not give the
HPRB’s recommendations any special weight.5 Neither the members of the HPRB, nor the
HPRB’s staff, the Historic Preservation Division (HPD), appear as a matter of right in hearings
before the Mayor’s Agent. In many hearings, no one appears except the applicant, the applicant’s
counsel, the applicant’s architectural experts, and other witnesses who are not formal parties in
the permit process.

1

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1101 et seq. (West 2001).

2

D.C. CODE A NN. §§ 6-1104 to 6-1107 (West 2001).

3

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1103 (West 2001).

4

Id.; see Comm. for Washington’s Riverfront Parks v. Thompson, 451 A.2d 1177, 1194 (D.C. 1982).

5

Comm. for Washington’s Riverfront Parks, 451 A.2d at 1194 (stating that the Mayor’s Agent need only
demonstrate that he considered the views of expert bodies, such as the Historic Preservation Review Board
(HPRB), and accepted or rejected them on a rational basis).
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The absence of zealous party opposition in favor of preservation and the Mayor’s Agent’s
minimal deference to the HPRB’s recommendations has led critics to question whether the permit
process adequately takes into account the public’s preservation interest. This interest could be
better served if the HPRB or its staff appeared as a party, testified as a witness, or presented
written findings in the permit hearings. This paper presents an analysis of the Mayor’s Agent
process over the last ten years and proposes possible changes to the process that would result in
better representation of the public’s interest in preservation. Part I of this paper explains the
Mayor’s Agent’s permit process and presents an overview of the Mayor’s Agent decisions from
1991 to 2001. Part II discusses recent cases that demonstrate some of the shortcomings in the
current process. Part III summarizes a series of interviews with preservationists and D.C.
government officials regarding ways the HPRB or the HPD could be more involved in
proceedings before the Mayor’s Agent. Part IV examines some of the legal issues under the D.C.
Historic Preservation Act and the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act associated with granting the
HPRB or the HPD a more active role in Mayor’s Agent proceedings.

Part I: An Explanation of the Mayor’s Agent’s Permitting Process and Overview of
Mayor’s Agent Decisions from 1991 to 2001
The statutory role of the HPRB as an advisory body for a mayorally-appointed
decision- maker is not out of line with other cities’ historic preservation ordinances.
Many preservation ordinances put the historic preservation commission in an advisory
role, as it is in D.C.6 Other ordinances give the historic preservation commission the

6

CHARTER AND CODE OF ORDINANCES, SAN A NTONIO TEXAS § 35-7015. The San Antonio ordinance gives
the preservation commission, which is an advisory body, a duty to “testify through the chairman or vice
chairman before all boards and commissions on any matter affecting, historically, culturally, architecturally
or archeologically exceptional, or significant areas, buildings, objects, sites, structures, clusters, historic
districts, property located in the River Walk area, or public property.” CHARTER AND CODE OF
ORDINANCES, SAN A NTONIO TEXAS § 35-7015(10); SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING CODE § 1111.2 and §
1111.3 viewed at http://www.amlegal.com/sanfranplanning on May 8, 2002; see Roddewig, supra note 6,
at 381-84.
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authority to grant or deny permits but allow appeal to the city council or the courts. 7
However, cities with strong preservation ordinances give decision- making power to a
body with some expertise in land-use planning, even if a body with preservation expertise
only advises the decision- maker. 8
In contrast, the D.C. statute creates an expert body of individuals appointed by the
mayor for their expertise on preservation issues and their ability to reflect the geographic,
racial, gender, and other demographic characteristics of the city. 9 However, the statute
accords only minimal decision- making authority to this highly expert and representative
body. An agent appointed by the mayor who is not statutorily required to have any
background in planning or preservation is given the final decision. 10 The Mayor’s Agent
need only demonstrate that he considered the views of the expert body and accepted or
rejected them on a rational basis. 11 A review of the Mayor’s Agent’s permitting process
and the outcome of decisions made under the process highlights the need for HPRB to
take measures to ensure that the Mayor’s Agent understands its expert opinion and takes
the HPRB’s opinion into account in his decision- making.

7

CHARTER AND CODE OF THE CITY OF A NNAPOLIS § 21.62.070 and § 21.62.150 (2001); NEW YORK CITY
CODE § 25-305 (2001); see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 112 (1978) (stating
that the Landmark Commission’s denial of a certificate of appropriateness may be appealed to the court);
Richard J. Roddewig, Preparing a Historic Preservation Ordinance, SG040 ALI-ABA 365, 384 (Oct. 1516, 2001); INTERNATIONAL M UNICIPAL LAWYERS A SSOCIATION, M ODEL HISTORIC PRESERVATION
ORDINANCE § 22-612 (2000).
8

CHARTER AND CODE OF ORDINANCES, SAN A NTONIO TEXAS § 35-7015; SAN FRANCISCO PLANNING CODE
§ 1111.2 and § 1111.3.
9

D.C. CODE § 6-1103.

10

D.C. CODE § 6-1102 (West 2001).

11

Thompson v. Riverfront Parks, 451 A.2d at 1194; In re 2700 Q Street, H.P.A. No. 01-149 (Dec. 4, 2001)
(page numbers unavailable).
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A. Review of the Permitting Process under the D.C. Historic Preservation Act
Under the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, owners of landmarks or contributing
buildings in historic districts may not alter, demolish or subdivide their property without
a permit. 12 Also, no owner of property in an historic district may construct a new
structure without a permit.13
Upon receipt, an application for a permit is referred to the HPRB, or if applicable
to the Old Georgetown Board (OGB) or the Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), 14 for a
recommendation on whether the owner’s proposed demolition, alteration, or subdivision
is “necessary in the public interest.”15 The OGB and the CFA serve in the same capacity
as the HPRB in the Georgetown Historic District. Throughout this paper’s analysis,
statistics on the Mayor’s Agent’s response to HPRB recommendations include OGB and
CFA recommendations as well.
The Act defines “necessary in the public interest” as consistent with the purposes
of the Act or necessary to allow the construction of a project of special merit. 16 However,
the HPRB traditionally has only made a recommendation on whether a proposal is
consistent with the Act. It has not touched the more politically sensitive question of
whether the permit is necessary to construct a project of special merit. As a practical
12

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1004; § 6-1105; § 6-1106.

13

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1107.

14

The Old Georgetown Board (OGB) and the Commission of Fine Arts (CFA) have jurisdiction over
properties in Georgetown and some other areas of the city under the Old Georgetown Act and the
Shipstead-Luce Act. Even where the OGB or the CFA has jurisdiction, the Mayor’s Agent may seek an
additional recommendation from the HPRB in permitting cases. See D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1104; § 6-1105;
§ 6-1106; § 6-1107.
15

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1104; § 6-1105; § 6-1106.
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matter, the special merit question arises most often in demolition cases, and demolition
permits are often approved at least in part because demolition is necessary to construct a
project of special merit. The fact that the HPPB and other boards do not generally opine
on special merit should therefore be considered a significant limitation on their authority.
After the HPRB issues its recommendation, the applicant proceeds to a hearing
before the Mayor’s Agent, who has authority to grant or deny the permit. The hearing
before the Mayor’s Agent is a contested case under the D.C. Administrative Procedure
Act. 17 The applicant may be represented by counsel, 18 and parties and persons may
appear in opposition to the permit application. 19 The Mayor’s Agent renders a decision
on whether granting the permit is consistent with the Act or necessary to construct a
project of special merit. The Mayor’s Agent may also grant the permit if he or she finds
that failure to grant the permit would result in unreasonable economic hardship to the
applicant. 20
The permitting process for new construction is identical to the process for other
permits except that there is a presumption in favor of granting a permit for new
construction. A permit for new construction will be granted unless the new construction
is incompatible with the character of the landmark or historic district. 21

16

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1102(10) (West 2001).

17

David Della Porta, Procedural Due Process under the District of Columbia Historic Preservation Act, 33
CAT H. U.L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1984).
18

D.C. M UN. REGS., tit. 10 § 2501.1 (Weil 2001).

19

D.C. M UN. REGS., tit. 10 § 2517.1 (Weil 2001).

20

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1104; § 6-1105; § 6-1006.
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B. Overview of Mayor’s Agent Decisions 1991-2001
Sixty-two Mayor’s Agent decisions issued between 1991 and 2001 were reviewed
for this paper. The decisions are available to the public on the Georgetown University
Law Center library website. 22 Not all of the Mayor’s Agent decisions from this ten-year
period are available to the public on the website. However, this review of the decisio ns
that are available should reveal some of the patterns in the Mayor’s Agent’s decisions. A
chart summarizing the analysis is attached in Appendix I.
From 1991 through 2001, the Mayor’s Agent for historic preservation decided at
least sixty-two permitting cases. Four different Mayor’s Agents served during the period
from 1991 to 1995. Rohulamin Quander has served since 1997. This paper divides the
decisions into two groups—those made between 1991 and 1995 and those made between
1997 and 2001. No 1996 decisions have been published on the Georgetown website at
this time.
Over the ten-year period, the Mayor’s Agent decided nineteen demolition cases,
thirty-one alteration cases, nine subdivision cases, and three cases involving new
construction. The cha racter of the cases before the Mayor’s Agent from 1991 to 1995
was significantly different from the character of the cases decided between 1997 and
2001.
First, from 1991 to 1995 approximately 60% of the Mayor’s Agent cases involved
alterations. 23 After 1997, that figure dropped to approximately 40%. 24 From 1997

21

D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1107.

22

http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/histpres/presdecisions.html .

23

17 out of 28 cases.

24

14 out of 34 cases.
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through 2001, the Mayor’s Agent also decided a slightly greater percentage of demolition
cases than he decided between 1991 and 1995, 25 and he decided many more subdivision
cases after 1997. 26
More importantly, from 1991 to 1995, twenty-two of the twenty-eight cases (more
than 75%) before the Mayor’s Agent involved some sort of opposition to the applicant’s
request for a permit. From 1997 to 2001, only half of all permit applications were
opposed at all. 27 At least nine cases decided between 1991 and 1995 had parties
appearing in opposition to an application for a permit. 28 After 1997, only two cases
involved opposition parties. 29 During both periods, persons or preservation groups who
opposed a permit application most commonly appeared as witnesses at the permitting
hearing or submitted written statements or letters in opposition to an application without
attempting to gain party status in the proceeding. At the same time, the percentage of
cases where the applicant was represented by counsel increased from 50% to almost
70%.30

25

29% as compared to 32%.

26

The Mayor’s Agent decided 9 subdivision cases between 1997 and 2001, as compared to 2 subdivision
cases from 1991 to 1995.
27

Between 1997 and 2001, 17 out of 34 decisions involved some opposition. The applicant defaulted in
one of these cases.
28

The Mayor’s Agents before 1997 do not always note whether a group appearing in opposition to an
application is a party or not. The party status of an opponent does not seem to affect the weight given to
the opposition’s arguments as much in these older cases as it does in the post-1997 cases, where the
Mayor’s Agent always notes the whether the opponent is a party.
29

In re Webster School, H.P.A. No. 00-462 (Feb. 15, 2001) and In re Archdiocese of Washington, H.P.A.
No. 99-219 (Nov. 11, 1999), settlement approved, H.P.A. 01-219 (Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter St. Patrick’s]
were the only two cases after 1997 where the opposition had party status.
30

Counsel represented the applicant in 14 of the 28 cases between 1991 and 1995. This figure increased to
23 out of 34 cases between 1997 and 2001.
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An analysis of the Mayor’s Agent decisions over the last ten years suggests that
the process before the Mayor’s Agent became increasingly contentious as applicants for
permits became more sophisticated and increasingly retained counsel to represent them in
the Mayor’s Agent process. Also, different Mayor’s Agents had different approaches to
the permitting process. Some preferred to treat the process more like a trial, while others
were less formal. 31 When the Mayor’s Agent was more formal, opposition groups fared
better when they appeared as parties, rather than appearing simply as witnesses. At the
same time, neighborhood and preservation groups, which depend on donations and
volunteer efforts, 32 seldom had the resources to appear as a party in every important case.
When opposition groups did not appear as parties in permitting proceedings, they
generally could not obtain outcomes that adequately addressed their preservation
concerns.
Several trends in the Mayor’s Agent’s decisions over the past ten years support
these conclusions. First, the lack of an opposition party in most cases since 1997 is
associated with an increase in the number of decisions where the Mayor’s Age nt
disagreed with the recommendations of the HPRB. Between 1991 and 1995, the Mayor’s
Agent reached an outcome contrary to the HPRB’s recommendation only twice. 33 Since
1997, the Mayor’s Agent disagreed with the HPRB’s recommendation in six of its thirty-

31

The current Mayor’s Agent prefers a more formal, trial-like process as compared to previous Mayor’s
Agents.
32

Telephone Interview with David Bell, President District of Columbia Preservation League (May 6,
2002).
33

In re The Monroe, H.P.A. No. 92-188 (Feb. 17, 1992) and In re 1927 Kenyon, H.P.A. 91-543 (Dec 9,
1991).
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four cases. 34 These numbers are not large, but this trend may indicate that the HPRB’s
recommendations receive less consideration than they once did. Moreover, several of the
cases in which the HPRB and the Mayor’s Agent disagreed involved important questions
of historic preservation precedent where the Mayor’s Agent could have benefited from
hearing the preservation point of view. Yet, in only one of these cases was there a party
in opposition to represent this viewpoint. 35
Between 1991 and 1995, the Mayor’s Agent granted only two demolition permits
for projects of special merit. Both of those involved opposition parties who settled with
the applicant. 36 Between 1997 and 2001, the Mayor’s Agent granted six demolition
permits for projects of special merit. Five of those involved no party opposition. 37 One
involved party opposition and settled. 38 The increased number of demolition permits
granted for projects of special merit is an important indicator that preservationists may
not be adequately represented in the permitting process. The HPRB does not generally
issue a recommendation on whether a project is one of special merit. So, unless a
preservation group contradicts the applicant’s arguments that a project is one of special
merit, the Mayor’s Agent is likely to accept the applicant’s reasoning. Since 1991, there
have been only two denials of demolition permits on special merit grounds where no
34

Approximately 18% of cases between 1997 and 2001.

35

In re The Monroe, H.P.A. No. 92-188 (Feb. 17, 1992), reversed, District of Columbia Preservation
League v. Dep’t of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 646 A.2d 984 (D.C. 1994).
36

In re Old Hecht Company Department Store Complex, H.P.A. No. 95-440 (Sept. 11, 1996) and In re
Engine Co. # 24, H.P.A. No. 93-330 (Mar. 31, 1994).
37

In re Calvary Baptist Church, H.P.A. No. 00-601 (Apr. 20, 2001); In re Phillips Collection, H.P.A. 00405 (Oct. 11, 2001); In re JBG Real Estate Assoc., H.P.A. No. 00-332 (Sept. 12, 2000); In re 1360 Half
Street, H.P.A. No. 99-401 (Dec, 13, 1999); In re 1901 Martin Luther King Avenue, H.P.A. No. 98-116
(July 1, 1998).
38

In re Archdiocese of Washington, H.P.A. No. 01-219 (Aug. 1, 2001).
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opposition party appeared. 39 The special merit demolition cases where no opposition
party appeared are also instructive because the Mayor’s Agent granted the permits despite
the high profiles and substantial community opposition in some of the cases. 40 In
addition, several of these cases are factually similar to cases where preservationists
successfully opposed a permit before the Mayor’s Agent. 41
The analysis of the Mayor’s Agent decisions also suggests that party opposition is
more effective in generating a positive outcome than testimony by persons opposed to the
permit who do not seek party status. In nine out of the fifteen cases involving non-party
opposition after 1997, the Mayor’s Agent granted the permit sought. At the same time, in
cases involving party opposition, the opposition party either successfully opposed the
permit or came to a settlement in all but one case over the ten- year period. 42 The success
of party-opposition as compared to non-party opposition in recent Mayor’s Agent
decisions suggests that opposition to permit applications will not be effective unless the
opposition attains party status in the proceedings before the Mayor’s Agent.

39

In the four special merit cases where opposition parties appeared, the opposition party always settled or
successfully fought the permit. Where no opposition party appeared in demolition cases involving special
merit determinations, the permit was granted in five out of the seven cases.
40

See, e.g., In re JBG Real Estate Assoc., H.P.A. No. 00-332 (Sept. 12, 2000).

41

Compare In re JBG Real Estate with In re The Archdiocese of Washington, H.P.A. Nos. 99-219 to 226
and 99-285 (Nov. 9, 1999), settlement approved, In the Matter of: The John Akridge Company and the
Archdiocese of Washington, H.P.A. Nos. 01-219 to 224 and 01-208 to 209 (Aug. 1, 2001), herinafter St.
Patrick’s.
42

Opposition parties either successfully opposed the permit application in the Mayor’s Agent proceeding or
on appeal to the D.C. Court of Appeals, or settled in all cases except In re 2501 Pennsylvania Avenue,
H.P.A. No. 91-261 (May 11, 1992), a subdivision case where the HPRB had recommended approval.
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Part II: A Review of Cases Demonstrating the Importance of
Vigorous Opposition Parties in the Permitting Process

A close reading of the Mayor’s Agent decisions over the last ten years reveals
trends that highlight the importance of a healthy adversarial process in vetting
preservation issues before the Mayor’s Agent. First, in cases without opposition parties,
no one ensured that the Mayor's Agent’s decision responded to the concerns of the HPRB
and took into account the expert insights that the HPRB and the other review boards
could provide. Also, where there was no opposition party, opportunities for adequate
cross-examination and rebuttal testimony were limited. Therefore, the Mayor's Agent
may not have been able to find the truth effectively. This problem was especially grave
when the decision involved a determination of special merit because the HPRB and
similar bodies generally do not make a recommendation on special merit. Without an
opposition party the Mayor's Agent had only the applicant's opinion on the special merit
of the proposal. Last, over the ten-year period, opposition parties successfully brokered
settlements that arguably better protected the public preservation interest. No such
settlements could be reached in cases without opposition parties. Each of these elements
is discussed below.

A. The Role of Opposition Parties in Ensuring that the Mayor's Agent Responds to
the HPRB's Concerns
Many of the Mayor’s Agent decisions did not respond directly to the concerns of
the HPRB. Rather, the Mayor’s Agent briefly noted the HPRB’s and the HPD’s concerns
and recommendations and then deferred to the testimony of the parties and witnesses
present at the hearing in making his findings of fact. The HPRB’s recommendations
- 12 -

were not accorded any special weight. Committee for Washington’s Riverfront Parks, 43
the leading case on this issue states that bodies like the HPRB, the OGB and the CFA
have special expertise in historic preservation; however they are merely advisory bodies.
Their status as advisory bodies means that their recommendations are not accorded the
same great weight that opinions of an Advisory Neighborhood Commission receive.
Still, because these boards have expertise, their opinions mean more than lay
testimony. The Mayor’s Agent need not explain why he accepts the testimony of one lay
witness over another. But, in the case of expert boards, the Mayor’s Agent must show
that the board’s decision was considered and accepted or rejected on a rational basis. 44 In
practice, this rational basis standard may not accord recommendations of the review
boards much more weight than the testimony of lay witnesses receives. Opposition
parties therefore played a crucial role at permitting hearings over the last ten years.
Without an opposition party, the HPRB’s arguments in favor of preservation were often
not brought out at the hearing.
The Metropolis Development Company45 case provides a good example of the
Mayor’s Agent’s failure to respond to the concerns of the HPRB. In that case, a
developer applied for a permit to build a ninety- foot tall condominium building in the
Greater U Street Historic District, only blocks from three of the most important buildings
in Washington, D.C. built by African Americans. There were no parties in opposition,
but the Committee of 100 on the Federal City wrote a letter in opposition to the permit.

43

451 A.2d 1177 (D.C. 1982).

44

Id. at 1194-1195.
In re Application for New Construction Permit, 2045 14th Street N.W., H.P.A. No. 00-194 (Dec. 14,
2000) [hereinafter Metropolis Development Company] (page numbers not available).
45
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The HPRB recommended denying the permit because although the design was
otherwise compatible with the historic district, the height of the building would make it at
least 20 feet taller than the tallest three buildings in the neighborhood—the True
Reformer Building, the Thurgood Marshall Center and the Prince Hall, all of which were
historically of enormous importance to the African American community.

46

The HPRB

felt that it was important to the Greater U Street Historic District that these buildings
stand out on the horizon and that new buildings in the Greater U Street Historic District
should not be allowed to visually dominate these buildings. 47
The Mayor’s Agent barely addressed this concern, characterizing the HPRB’s
decision as, “focused on height rather than evaluating the overall compatibility of any
proposed new construction with the height of the buildings already there.”48 The
Mayor’s Agent then accepted the applicant’s argument that the building was compatible
because its massing was similar to the other buildings in the neighborhood. 49 The
applicant also convinced the Mayor’s Agent that the new building’s extra height would
have a minimal impact because it would be next to a park. 50 Most ironically, the Mayor’s
Agent believed that the new building would be compatible with the True Reformer
Building, Thurgood Marshall Center and Prince Hall because it would punctuate the
skyline in a way that echoed the rhythm created by these buildings. 51

46

Id.

47

Tersh Boasberg lecture on the Metropolis Development Case, Historic Preservation Seminar class.

48

Metropolis Development Company, H.P.A. No. 00-194.

49

Id.

50

Id.
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Had an opposition party been present at the Mayor’s Agent hearing, the
opposition party may have ensured that the Mayor’s Agent responded to the HPRB’s
concerns that more tall buildings would destroy rather than enhance the position of
physical prominence that the three historic buildings enjoyed. Preserving the physical
prominence of the three historic buildings would not only preserve the skyline as it
existed at the neighborhood’s peak, but also would remind to the community of the
historical significance of the buildings. The Mayor’s Agent may have decided that the
HPRB was wrong anyway. Still, he should have seriously considered HPRB’s concerns.
In contrast to Metropolis Development Company, the Reneau case provides a
good example of how opposition parties can convince the Mayor’s Agent of the
importance of preserving elements of a neighborhood. 52 Mr. Reneau planned to convert
his three-story home into a condominium building. He applied for an alteration permit
for, among other things, a fourth- floor addition, which he had already built, and a thirdfloor rear deck. The HPRB recommended denying the permit as inconsistent with the
character of the Dupont Circle Historic District, and the applicant appealed to the
Mayor’s Agent. At the hearing before the Mayor’s Agent, the Dupont Circle
Conservancy and the D.C. Preservation League (DCPL) appeared as parties in opposition
to the application. The local ANC had also expressed its opposition to the permit. 53 The
primary issue in the case was whether additions that were invisible from the front of the

51

Id.

52

In re 1312 21st Street NW, H.P.A. No. 92-104 (June 1, 1993), aff’d, Reneau v. District of Columbia, 676
A.2d 913 (1996)[hereinafter Reneau].
53

Id. at 9-10.
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building but that were visible from side streets and from other angles were compatible
with the historic district. 54
In this case, the opposition parties convinced the Mayor’s Agent that their
concerns for vistas throughout the neighborhood were well founded and that preservation
included more than preserving appearances from the front of the building. The parties
showed that preservation demanded taking into account other sight lines and the impact
of the alteration on views from the entire historic district. 55 The opposition also
convinced the Mayor’s Agent that the existence of other visible additions throughout the
neighborhood had no bearing on this application because the compatibility of those
additions was not the issue in this case. 56 Last, the opposition convinced the Mayor’s
Agent that the additions were not necessary to encourage the adaptation of the building to
condominium living. 57 The opposition’s success here is particularly stunning because the
report of the HPD emphasized that additions should not be visible from the front of the
building but stated that additions would otherwise be allowed.

58

The HPRB only voted

on a proposed addition that would have been visible from the front of the building. 59 Mr.
Reneau modified his proposal before appealing his case to the Mayor’s Agent. In this
situation, one could imagine that had no opposition party appeared, Mr. Reneau could
have successfully used the HPD’s report and the existence of other non-visible additions

54

Id. at 12.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 13.

58

Id. at 7.

59

Id. at 4-5.
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in the neighborhood to show that his proposed addition was compatible with the historic
district. 60

B. The Importance of a Strong Opposition for Ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent
Values Preservation Boards’ Expert Opinions
When no opposition party appears, no one ensures that the valuable insights that
expert bodies, such as HPRB, the OGB or the CFA, provide are highlighted before the
Mayor’s Agent. The Kew Gardens decision, which limits the period of significance of
the Georgetown Historic District, is an example of such a decision. 61 The Kew Gardens
apartment building, located in the Georgetown Historic District, was built during 1922
and 1923. In 1999, the building’s management began exploring possibilities for
replacing window sashes in the building. In January 2001, the management applied for a
permit to replace the original windows with modern windows. The OGB, which
performs the functions of the HPRB within the Georgetown Historic District, denied the
application, the CFA affirmed the OGB’s decision, and the applicant appealed to the
Mayor’s Agent.
At the Mayor’s Agent hearing, the applicant argued that the Mayor’s Agent
should reverse the OGB and the CFA because these boards failed to recognize that Kew
Gardens was not a contributing building in the Georgetown Historic District. The
Mayor’s Agent granted the permit, finding that the period of significance for the

60

Note that in a case like this one, where arguably the HPRB has already advised the Mayor’s Agent of its
position, the Mayor’s Agent might not be required to remand for more advise.
61

In re 2700 Q Street, H.P.A. No. 01-149 (Dec. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Kew Gardens] (page numbers
unavailable).
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Georgetown Historic District ends fifty years after American Independence. 62 The
Mayor’s Agent’s decision has the possible effect of denying historic preservation
protection against alteration and demolition to buildings in Georgetown constructed after
1830. The Mayor's Agent's decision here contradicted consensus among the preservation
community.
David Maloney, Director of the Historic Preservation Division appeared at the
Mayor’s Agent hearing as a witness. 63 He testified that the preservation community
generally agrees that Georgetown's period of significance extends through 1930.
Buildings built after World War I reflect an important period in Georgetown’s history
when the neighborhood became one of America’s worst slums but then experienced
tremendous rejuvenation. 64 No one appeared as a party in opposition to the applicant at
the hearing.
Had an opposition party appeared, that party would have highlighted the
importance of Mr. Maloney's testimony. With no one to emphasize Mr. Maloney's
expertise and the fact that he was stating the consensus view, the Mayor’s Agent rejected
Mr. Maloney’s analysis because “the historic district was established to protect properties
constructed in Georgetown’s early history, i.e. the first 50 years of the nation’s
existence.”65 In rejecting Mr. Maloney’s testimony, the Mayor’s Agent relied on an
overly narrow definition of period of significance that focused on only the important
62

Id.

63

Mr. Maloney testified in his personal capacity apparently because he was unable to establish to the
Mayor’s Agent’s satisfaction that he was authorized to speak for the Historic Preservation Division (HPD)
or any other entity of the D.C. government. Telephone Interview with David Maloney, Director, D.C.
Historic Preservation Division (May 1, 2002).`
64

Id.
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events and characteristics of the neighborhood that Congress initially used in designating
the neighborhood in 1950. In particular, the Mayor’s Agent refused to consider a
statement made by the National Historic Landmark Boundary Review Project in 1980
that described the historical significance of the Georgetown neighborhood as extending
through 1930. The Mayor’s Agent gave great consideration to the fact that “this
document did not expand the historic district, nor was it generated or approved by the
approved by the District of Columbia, and …the language relied upon was not in the
historic district designation documents.”66 An opposition party in this case could have
helped the Mayor’s Agent to understand that these details did not preclude him from
viewing Kew Gardens as a contributing building if experts in the historic preservation
community agreed that the period of significance extended farther than 1830.

C. The Adversarial Process Promotes Truth Finding in Preservation Decisions
The D.C. Historic Preservation Act makes the permitting process before the
Mayor’s Agent a contested case, not a legislative hearing. Therefore, the Act presumes
that the Mayor’s Agent can most effectively discover the truth and decide whether a
permit should be granted when multiple parties present their own version of the truth,
cross-examine each other’s evidence, and rebut each other’s testimony. In cases where
only the applicant appears, the Mayor’s Agent may attempt to compensate for the lack of
an opposition party with his own questions to the applicant. However, the Mayor’s
Agent is a poor substitute for a vigorous opposition with the time, resources and
motivation to thoroughly investigate the holes in an applicant’s case. The Mayor’s Agent
65
66

Id.
Id.
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often seems to defer to the testimony of the witnesses present and the findings of the
HPRB. As discussed above, the applicant can effectively minimize the concerns of the
HPRB when there is no opposition. Also, the HPRB and similar entities’
recommendations are limited to whether a proposal is consistent with the act, and do not
discuss whether a proposal is necessary for a project of special merit. As a result, when
there is no opposition, the Mayor’s Agent’s ability to arrive at accurate findings of fact is
limited, especially in cases involving a special merit determination. The Webster School
case 67 shows the important role that opposition parties can play in cross-examination and
truth finding.
The National Transportation Employees Union (NTEU), which held development
rights over the Webster School, a landmarked property, applied for a permit to demolish
the entire Webster School building and replace it with an office building that would
house a cooking school on the lower floors. The HPRB recommended denial of the
demolition permit as inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and NTEU appealed to the
Mayor’s Agent, claiming that denial of the permit resulted in unreasonable economic
hardship and that the proposed project was one of special merit. The D.C. Preservation
League (DCPL) appeared as a party in opposition to the demolition permit.
DCPL’s involvement exemplified the vigorous prosecution of a case that only a
party can perform. The record in the case was extensive. The Mayor’s Agent’s decision
stated that he gave close consideration to:
1.) the voluminous pre-hearing and post-hearing pleadings filed by both the
Applicants and DCPL in opposition, and the approximately 70 multi-part exhibits, a total
of more than 1,000 pages; 2.) the widely conflicting and often irreconcilable testimony of

67

H.P.A. No. 00-462 (Feb. 16, 2001).
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16 witnesses over the course of three days, creating a transcript of 965 pages; 3) historic
preservation laws of the District of Columbia, the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act,
and each case…referred to by the applicants and DCPL… 68
The sheer volume of evidence and legal authority presented in the Webster School case
presented a sharp contrast to cases where no opposition party appeared.
NTEU’s primary argument for the proposal’s special merit was that the new
building would house a cooking school for at-risk youth. Expansion of services to lowincome people has often been a compelling reason for finding that a proposed demolition
is necessary to construct a project of special merit. However, in this case, DCPL
successfully showed that the NTEU did not provide enough details about the cooking
school’s benefit to low- income persons to justify the demolition of the historic school
building. 69 DCPL also successfully argued that denial of the demolition permit would not
constitute unreasonable economic hardship because NTEU was not deprived of all
reasonable economic use. 70 Also, the Mayor’s Agent accepted DCPL’s argument that
failure to grant the permit would not result in unreasonable economic hardship because at
the time NTEU bought the building it had notice that the building would likely be
landmarked; therefore NTEU assumed the risk. 71 This last point would probably not
have been brought out but for DCPL’s investigation as an opposition party in the case.

68

Id. at 2.

69

Id. at 15.

70

Id. at 19-23.

71

Id. at 4-5, 23.
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D. The Adversarial Process in Reaching Settlements that Fulfill Community
Interests in Preservation and Development
Opposition parties can successfully broker settlements that protect the public
preservation interest. In approximately half of the cases involving opposition parties over
the last ten years, the parties came to a settlement that arguably protected the historic
fabric of the city while allowing old buildings to be adapted to current use. The
importance of opposition parties is highlighted by the fact that some of the cases where
the parties settled were factually similar to cases where no opposition party appeared and
a demolition permit was granted. For example, the applicants in both the Saint Patrick’s
case 72 and the JBG Real Estate case 73 proposed demolishing some of the last low-scale
commercial strips in the Downtown Historic District to build large buildings that would
house offices, condominiums, artists’ studios and retail space. Both applicants claimed
their proposals were projects of special merit because they proposed uses that were
considered very important in the Living Downtown Plan and the D.C. Comprehensive
Plan.
The D.C. Preservation League and three other organizations appeared as
opposition parties in the St. Patrick’s case. The opposition parties conducted a probing
inquiry into the applicant Archdiocese of Washington’s claims that its project was one of
special merit. The Mayor’s Agent denied the Archdiocese’s first application for a
demolition permit. Two years later, the parties reached a settlement. 74 The settlement
allowed the construction of a new bigger building but preserved substantially more of the
72

In re Archdiocese of Washington, H.P.A. No. 99-219 (Nov. 9, 1999), settlement approved, H.P.A. No.
01-219 (Aug. 1, 2001) [hereinafter St. Patrick’s].
73

In re JBG Real Estate, H.P.A. No. 00-332 (Sept. 13, 2000).
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historic buildings than the original proposal would have preserved. 75 The settlement
went farther than the original proposal to ensure that high-priority uses under the
Comprehensive Plan were carried out on the site. It guaranteed somewhat more arts
space and use for social services than the original proposal, in addition to preserving
more of the original buildings. 76
In contrast, DCPL applied for but was denied party status in the JBG Real Estate
case. 77 In its motion for party status, DCPL made arguments against the JBG project
similar to those it made in the St. Patrick’s case. 78 Without a party in opposition, the
Mayor’s Agent did not make a probing inquiry into the applicant’s claims that it had done
everything possible to preserve the historic buildings or into the applicant’s claims that
the project was one of special merit. The Mayor’s Agent granted a permit to demolish all
but 20 feet of the historic buildings, despite the existence of community opposition
similar to that in the St. Patrick’s case. 79 The factual parallels between the two cases
suggest that had DCPL been granted party status in the JBG Real Estate proceeding,
DCPL possibly could have worked toward a settlement similar to the one reached in the
St. Patrick’s case.

74

See St. Patrick’s, H.P.A. No. 99-219.

75

See H.P.A. No. 01-219.

76

Id.

77

JBG Real Estate, H.P.A. No. 00-332 (Sept. 13, 2000) (page numbers unavailable). Though the Mayor’s
Agent does not state his reasons for denying the D.C. Preservation League (DCPL) party status, context
suggests that he denied DCPL party status on procedural grounds.
78

Id.

79

Id.
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Part III: Review of Interviews with Preservationists and D.C. Government
Employees Regarding Whether the HPRB or the HPD Should Appear as a
Party in Proceedings Before the Mayor’s Agent
The Mayor’s Agent decisions over the past ten years reveal some of the problems
that can occur when a process that was designed to be adversarial becomes one-sided.
They suggest that some measure should be taken to correct the deficiencies in the
process. Yet, the decisions suggest no obvious solution. Proceedings before the Mayor’s
Agent for Historic Preservation are contested cases under the D.C. Administrative
Procedure Act. Therefore, allowing the HPRB or its staff, the Historic Preservation
Division (HPD), to appear as a party or limited party in Mayor’s Agent permitting
hearings is one proposed change that may better protect the public’s preservation interest.
This section summarizes interviews on the subject with three preservationists and two
D.C. government employees involved in preservation. 80

The interviews lead to the

conclusion that allowing the HPRB or the HPD to become a full party to Mayor’s Agent
proceedings would be politically unpalatable at this time.
Four of the five individuals I interviewed thought that the HPRB or the HPD
should take a more active role in Mayor’s Agent proceedings. They felt this would help
to ensure that the Mayor’s Agent properly valued the HPRB and its staff’s expertise in
historic preservation. However, all of the interviewees, even those who supported greater
participation by the HPRB or the HPD, raised serious questions about both the HPRB’s
and the HPD’s institutional competency to take on a greater role in these proceedings.

80

Because of the sensitive nature of this topic, I am listing the names of those interviewed here but I will
not cite their comments. I spoke with Bruce Brennan, Senior Corporation Counsel; David Maloney,
Director of the D.C. Historic Preservation Division; Edwin Fountain and Andrea Ferster, Counsel for
DCPL, and David Be ll, President DCPL.
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Those who supported greater participation were divided on which body should
appear before the Mayor’s Agent. Some felt that the HPRB was in the best position
because the HPRB makes recommendations directly to the Mayor’s Agent. In fact, the
HPRB has a statutory charge to do so. Also, the HPD’s report gets a thorough airing
before the HPRB in the hearing in which the HPRB forms its recommendation. Thus, the
staff opinion is already taken into account in the HPRB’s recommendation. Also, one
interviewee thought that the board members might be more effective advocates than the
staff because board members are appointed by the mayor. Their role as political
appointees gives them the ability to speak forcefully, whereas the HPD staff need to
maintain their institutional relationships within the Office of Planning and cannot afford
to take as many strong positions.
The HPRB’s main shortcoming, according to the individuals who supported
greater participation, is that the HPRB members might not have as much preservation
expertise as the HPD staff. One interviewee also felt the HPD was better suited to fill the
advocacy role because the HPRB is a quasi- judicial body with a responsibility to
neutrally weigh the issues.
Generally, the individuals who supported greater participation suggested confining
the role of whichever entity participated to explaining why it made its recommendation,
and answering questions from the Mayor’s Agent. One person pointed out that if the
HPRB appeared for the purpose of explaining its recommendation, the Mayor’s Agent
probably would not stop the HPRB from asking a few questions as well. Some suggested
that the HPRB or the HPD might be able to ask questions on its own. However, others
felt that the ability to question or cross-examine the applicant allowed the HPRB or the
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HPD a “second bite at the apple” and might be unfair because the board and staff both
had the opportunity to question the applicant prior to the Mayor’s Agent hearing.
Several interviewees also mentioned that at a minimum, the HPRB could better
discharge its duty to advise the Mayor’s Agent by ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent got a
written summary of the HPRB’s decision. The Mayor’s Agent at one time received the
transcript of the HPRB hearing, but reproducing the entire transcript became too
expensive. Recently, the Mayor’s Agent often has received only the HPD’s staff report
and the portion of the transcript where the HPRB announces its decision. At the very
least, ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent receives the full transcript of the HPRB hearing
allows the Mayor’s Agent to take into account the same factors that influenced the
HPRB. In particular, the Mayor’s Agent will not miss the testimony of witnesses who
opposed an application before the HPRB but who do not appear before the Mayor’s
Agent.
The HPRB could also write a decision explaining its opinion. However, in cases
where the HPRB simply adopts the HPD staff report, a written opinion would be
duplicative. Even in cases in which the HPRB’s recommendation differs from the staff
report, producing a written opinion might be a less effective use of limited resources tha n
sending a witness to the Mayor’s Agent hearing to explain the HPRB’s recommendation.
The HPRB does not currently produce a written opinion. However, two
interviewees believed that formal findings by the HPRB, not appearance before the
Mayor’s Agent, could be the crucial element in ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent gives
proper deference to the HPRB’s expertise. In particular, formal findings seemed safer
from an institutional competence standpoint than witness testimony because formal
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findings reflect the consensus of the board. A single board member, testifying for the
entire board, might be prone to make post hoc rationalizations that do not reflect the
consensus of the entire board.
Two of the interviewees believed that in the correct political context, the HPRB or the
HPD could take strong preservation stances and pursue them as a full party to Mayor’s
Agent proceedings. However, consensus was that this political situation does not yet
exist in D.C. One of the interviewees explained that at the time that the Historic
Preservation Act was drafted, political leaders in D.C. regarded preservationists as
adverse to economic development. The D.C. Historic Preservation Act’s drafters
structured the Mayor’s Agent process to allow the political branches to override the
recommendations of the Historic Preservation Review Board. Over time, the HPD has
proved that it can work cooperatively with applicants to protect historic resources and
allow development. The HPRB has proved that it can be reasonable in its preservation
recommendations. During the 20 years since the enactment of the Historic Preservation
Act, these two entities have earned a place for preservation concerns in the city’s
development decisions. However, historic preservation is still a new voice in land- use
planning, and there are so many stake- holders in preservation decisions that changes in
the role of the HPRB cannot be made without notice and consensus.
Additionally, those who did not support allowing the HPRB or its staff to appear
as a full party felt that full participation in Mayor’s Agent proceedings, including the
right to rigorously cross-examine witnesses and to appeal Mayor’s Agent decisions,
would compromise the HPRB’s neutrality
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One interviewee aptly observed that perhaps the HPRB or the HPD’s participation
in Mayor’s Agent proceedings should be limited because the groups are charged with
protecting the public’s preservation interest in Mayor’s Agent proceedings. As a result,
they do not have a traditional adversarial relationship with the applicant. Rather, they
have a watchdog role to ensure that the standards in the Historic Preservation Act are
met. This interviewee also recognized that broad participation in Mayor’s Agent
proceedings is consistent with the statute’s vision of a cooperative process in which input
comes from multiple expert sources, including bodies with expertise in history and bodies
with expertise in land- use planning.
All of the interviewees were adamant that the HPRB should not make a
recommendation on special merit and that the HPRB should not get the type of “great
weight” accorded to bodies like the Advisory Neighborhood Commissions (ANC’s).
First, the individuals felt that the HPRB lacked the expertise to opine on the factors taken
into account in special merit decisions. The HPRB might be able to express an opinion
on “exemplary architecture.” However, the body is not qualified to opine on issues of
land planning or social or other benefits having a high priority for community services. 81
One person feared the HPRB would drag itself into a situation in which it would be crossexamined on matters beyond its ken. Another feared that, in addition to pulling the
HPRB into areas outside of its area of expertise, issuing an opinion on special merit could
work against the HPRB in the future. Presently, the HPRB wants to make strong
preservation decisions. However, in the future, a less preservation conscious board or a
board subject to political pressure could potentially advocate for a demolition as
necessary to construct a project of special merit. Such a role would be anathema to the
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HPRB’s statutory responsibility to advise on whether a demolition is consistent with the
Act because substantial demolition is never consistent with the purposes of the Act, as
stated in § 6-1101.82
One interviewee observed that applying the great weight standard to the HPRB’s
recommendations might hamper the Mayor’s Agent’s administration of the statute if an
ANC participated in the decision-making process at all. If the HPRB took the ANC’s
opinion into account, the Mayor’s Agent would be applying great weight to an HPRB
opinion that already applied great weight to an ANC opinion. If an ANC and the HPRB
disagreed, coming to an opinion might prove difficult for the Mayor’s Agent, particularly
if the HPRB did not adequately explain its reasons for rejecting the ANC’s opinion.
Finally, several preservationists felt that it would be appropriate for the Office of
Planning to appear as a full party and litigate a special merit case. Now that the HPD is a
part of the Office of Planning, that office is capable of examining both the development
and the preservation issues in a case and forming an opinion. Even in alteration cases
involving issues like the HPD’s window standards, the HPD should convince the Office
of Planning to present the HPD’s opinion much as the Office of Planning does in zoning
cases.
Part IV: Legal Analysis of the HPRB’s or the HPD’s Options for Greater
Participation in Mayor’s Agent Hearings
A. Review of Intervention in Administrative Proceedings Generally

81

See the definition of “special merit,” D.C. Code § 6-1102(11).

82

This section states that the Act’s purposes include retaining and enhancing landmarks and contributing
buildings in historic districts.
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None of the interviewees would support a plan that would allow either the HPRB or the
HPD to participate as a full party in Mayor’s Agent proceedings. However, a number of the
interviewees felt that either of these bodies might be able to take a more limited role in Mayor’s
Agent proceedings. The possible scope of the HPRB or the HPD’s participation depends on the
constraints that D.C. administrative law places on limited participation in administrative hearings
by interested parties and persons.
The D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (DCAPA), although not identical to the federal
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), is heavily influenced by the APA.83 Thus, in situations
where D.C. administrative la w is ambiguous, analogies in the federal law often provide clarity. 84
Both the APA and the DCAPA take a liberal approach to intervention in adjudication.
Both have expansive definitions of the term “party” and allow interested persons who do not
qualify to participate as full parties to appear as “limited parties.”
The federal APA defines a party as “a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in an agency proceeding, and a
person or agency admitted by an agency as a party for limited purposes.” 85 The DCAPA
definition of a party is very similar to the federal APA definition, providing:
The term party includes the Mayor or any person or agency named or admitted as a party, or
properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party in any proceeding before
the Mayor or an agency, but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the Mayor or an
agency from admitting the Mayor or any person or agency as a party for limited purposes.86
83

See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000); D.C. CODE § 2-502 (West 2001) (providing very similar definitions of
terms used throughout both acts). See also Lee v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Appeals and Review, 423 A.2d
210, 216 (D.C. 1980) (“[A]lthough there are slight differences in language between the federal APA’s
standing provision. . .and its D.C. counterpart, the two provisions were intended to be interpreted virtually
identically. . . .Thus. . .it is appropriate for us to seek guidance from federal court interpretations of the
APA’s standing requirements”); Debruhl v. Dist. of Columbia Hackers’ License Appeals Bd., 384 A.2d
421, 424 (D.C. 1978) (stating that the term “contested case” in the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act was
meant to be synonymous with the term “adjudication” in the federal APA).
84

Debruhl, 384 A.2d at 424 (stating that because the term “contested case” is synonymous with
adjudication “decisions of this court construing such a provision, in so far as feasible, should be
harmonious with those of the federal courts construing the corresponding provision of the federal APA”).
85

5 U.S.C. § 551(3) (2000).
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Moreover, the federal APA places few limits on intervention in administrative adjudication,
allowing interested persons to appear before an agency “[s]o far as the orderly conduct of
business permits.”87 (emphasis added). Likewise, the DCAPA codifies a policy of liberally
allowing interested persons to present relevant testimony as limited parties in adjudicative
hearings while seeking to limit overly time-consuming or irrelevant testimony. The DCAPA
states:
In contested cases, except as may otherwise be provided by law, other than this subchapter,
. . .every party shall have the right to present in person or by counsel his case or defense by
oral and documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such crossexamination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.88 (emphasis
added).
Thus, the DCAPA appears to place limits on intervention in D.C. administrative proceedings that
are similar to the limits on intervention in federal proceedings. A review of the literature on
federal intervention law is helpful for understanding how the Mayor’s Agent would be likely to
treat the HPRB or the HPD as a potential intervenor.
Standing to intervene in proceedings before administrative agencies, although informed
by concepts of judicial standing, is not identical to judicial standing. 89 Administrative and
judicial standing pursue different policies. Courts are limited to deciding controversies between
parties and must be certain that the parties before them have adversarial interests.90 In contrast,
agencies, even when they are adjudicating cases, have a responsibility to promote the public
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D.C. CODE A NN. § 2-503(10) (West 2001).
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5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2000); see CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., W EST ’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE §
7721 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that this section permits intervention but seeks to prohibit “debilitating
intervention”).
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D.C. CODE A NN. § 2-509(b) (West 2001).
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RICHARD J. PIERCE , JR., A DMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.10 (4th ed. 2002).

90

RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., A DMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.5 (3d ed. 1999), citing U.S. CONST .
A RT . III § 2.
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interest that requires them to thoroughly explore the issues.91 The class of people with an interest
in an agency’s review of an issue is likely to be larger than the class of people with standing to
challenge the agency’s action in court. 92 This fact mandates that the agencies have liberal rules
for intervention. Allowing liberal intervention in agency adjudication also serves to legitimize
agency action. When diverse interests are involved in agency decision-making, the process
seems more democratic and agencies are less prone to bias in favor of the regulated industry. 93
At the same time, adjudication is not rulemaking. The agency must arrive at a decision
for a particular party. Thus, the agency may not ignore or prejudice the rights of true or full
parties when it admits limited parties.94 Moreover, agencies must be sensitive to the possibility
that intervention of additional parties will stall the decision-making process or confuse the
issues.95
Therefore, ALJs are allowed enormous discretion in making intervention decisions.96
Subject only to the often amorphous constraints of their jurisdiction’s administrative procedure
act and their agency’s organic statute and regulations,97 ALJs may exclude intervenors 98 or admit
them but limit the issues the intervenors may litigate and the methods they may use.99 Typical
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KOCH, supra note 10, at § 7721.

92

Id.; see also A LFRED C. A MAN , JR. & W ILLIAM T. M AYTON, A DMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.4.1 (1993);
PIERCE , supra note 12, at § 16.10.
93

PIERCE ET AL ., supra note 13, at § 5.5.3.
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A DMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE A CT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 196-97, 253 (1946).
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A MAN & M AYTON, supra note 15, at § 8.4.1; KOCH, supra note 10, at § 7721.
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Courts generally review ALJs’ intervention decisions under an abuse of discretion standard. KOCH, supra
note 10, at § 7721.
97

See PIERCE , supra note 12, at § 16.10.

98

ALJs will typically refuse intervenor status if they feel a party simply wants to delay the proceeding or if
the intervenors’ interests are already represented. A MAN & M AYTON , supra note 15, at § 8.4.2.
99

KOCH, supra note 10, at § 7721; see Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C.L. REV. 1, 58-70 (1995).
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restrictions include limiting a party’s right to cross-examine witnesses or present rebuttal
evidence and limiting a party to presenting written testimony. 100 The Administrative Conference
has recommended that ALJs balance five factors in setting limits on intervention:
1. The nature of the contested issues;
2. The intervenor’s precise interest in the subject matter;
3. Whether other parties already present will represent the intervenor’s interest;
4. The ability of the proposed intervenor to present relevant evidence and arguments; and
5. The effect of the intervention on the agency’s implementation of its statutory mandate.101
By analyzing these factors, ALJs may determine whether a particular intervenor will
assist the ALJ in analyzing the issues and coming to a decision that is in the public interest.
These factors can also help ALJs to determine the appropriate scope of an intervenor’s
participation.
B. Could the HPD or the HPRB Appear as a Limited Party in Mayor’s Agent
Proceedings?
The Historic Preservation Act is silent with regard to who may be a party to Mayor’s
Agent proceedings,102 however the regulations implementing the Historic Preservation Act shed
some light on this issue. First, the regulations define the term party as “the applicant and any
affected person in support of or in opposition to the application who complies with § 2516,”
requiring certain information to be filed with the Mayor’s Agent. 103 Section 2517 requires that

100

A MAN & M AYTON, supra note 15, at § 8.4.2; Noah, supra note 22, at 67-70; PIERCE ET AL., supra note
13, at § 5.5.
101

RECOMMENDATION 28 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES—PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN A DMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, reprinted in Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 547-550 (1972).
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The legislative history indicates that the drafters intended the term party refer to “ an individual or
organization aggrieved by the action of the Mayor.” The legislative history does not indicate that that the
drafters ever anticipated that the HPRB might want to appear as a party in Mayor’s Agent proceedings.
Council of the District of Columbia Report, Bill 2-367, The Historic Landmark and Historic District
Protection Act of 1978, p. 14.
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any persons wishing to appear as parties must file a written statement, “setting forth the manner
in which he or she may be affected or aggrieved by action upon the application and the grounds
upon which he or she supports or opposes the application.”104

1. Does the HPRB or the HPD have Administrative Standing?
The critical question is whether the HPRB or the HPD can be considered affected or
aggrieved by a decision of the Mayor’s Agent within the meaning of the regulations. Standing to
participate as a party in administrative hearings, as discussed earlier, is broader than standing to
participate as a party in judicial hearings. 105 Even if the HPRB and the HPD lack standing to
challenge a Mayor’s Agent’s decision in court, perhaps the agencies could still participate in
Mayor’s Agent’s hearings as long as they could show that they would be affected by the Mayor’s
Agent’s decision. The HPRB’s statutory mission to protect public preservation interests gives it a
strong interest in the outcome of Mayor’s Agent proceedings. The HPD’s role of assisting the
HPRB is a more remote an interest.
The HPRB could claim that an adverse decision by the Mayor’s Agent would hurt the
HPRB in carrying out its primary statutory mission—protecting the historic fabric of the city
though landmarking and establishing historic districts. Overly permissive decisions on
alterations, demolitions, and new construction could render landmark status meaningless. The
Act charges the HPRB with a duty to “promote the use of landmarks and historic districts for the
education, pleasure and welfare of the people of the District of Columbia.” 106
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D.C. M UN. REG., tit. 10 § 2599.1 (Weil 2000).

104

D.C. M UN. REG., tit. 10 § 2517.1(d) (Weil 2000).
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Goto v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917, 921 n. 8 (D.C. 1980).
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D.C. CODE A NN. § 6-1101 (2001).
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Another argument hinges on the duty of the HPRB to issue recommendations to the
Mayor’s Agent regarding demolition, alteration, subdivision, and new construction permit
applications. 107 When Mayor’s Agent grants a permit in a case without allowing the HPRB to
intervene as a limited party, the HPRB may not be aggrieved enough to have standing in a court.
However, the HPRB is affected because the process was conducted in a way that jeopardized the
HPRB’s ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities. The HPRB has a statutory mission to
help the Mayor’s Agent properly evaluate the historic, cultural, and aesthetic value of a property,
so that it can be accurately weighed against the applicant’s proposal. Systematic exclusion from
the Mayor’s Agent’s decision-making process undercuts the HPRB’s ability to carry out this
mission and renders the HPRB an aggrieved party within the meaning of the regulations.
Although precedent for this approach does not exist in D.C., injury to an agency’s ability to carry
out its statutory mission may be enough to make the agency an aggrieved party.
The HPRB easily fulfills the other four criteria in the Advisory Commission’s balancing
test. To the extent that permit hearings deal with evaluating historic resources, the HPRB is
extremely qualified and can present relevant evidence and arguments. There are unlikely to be
other parties that represent the HPRB’s interests because the HPRB is likely to use its limited
resources to appear in cases where it believes that no other party adequately represents the
public’s preservation interest. Last, added input from the HPRB would enhance the Mayor’s
Agent’s implementation of his statutory mission because the HPRB is an expert agency on
preservation issues charged with a duty to help the Mayor’s Agent carry out his own statutory
mission.
2. As a Legal Matter does Participation as a Limited Party Jeopardize the HPRB’s
Neutrality?
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The interviewees raised another important issue when they asked whether the HPRB can
or should act in a quasi-judicial role when forming its recommendation and later advocate for its
point of view before the Mayor’s Agent. Administrative law generally prohibits administrative
prosecutorial officers from later presiding over decision-making in the same or a factually similar
case.108 But, the HPRB would be performing these functions in reverse. It would neutrally
consider the matter and then appear before the Mayor’s Agent to defend its decision much as
other agencies do when their decisions are challenged in court. Therefore, the neutrality concerns
that motivate the ban are greatly reduced in the case of the HPRB. In fact, the HPRB may be the
most legitimate representative of public’s preservation interests because it is required to neutrally
consider all of the issues when it forms its recommendations to the Mayor’s Agent.
In addition, Park v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board discussed
the limitations on government employees’ ability to prosecute and adjudicate over the same
case.109 “According to the ‘multiple hat rule’ it is not per se improper for an official who holds
two governmental positions…to become involved in both the investigation and the determination
of the same cases.”110 Rather, the question is whether the roles are so incompatible as to
“overcome the presumption that the Board members acted fairly.”111 In Park , a member of the
alcohol licensing board, who was also a member of the affected Advisory Neighborhood
Commission (ANC), talked to community members and surveyed the neighborhood to determine
whether an alcohol license should be granted to Mr. Park’s convenience store. He then reported
to the alcohol licensing board that the principal of a school forty-six feet from the convenience
store had told him that the area was already full of prostitutes, drugs, and loiterers. The D.C.
Court of Appeals found that the board member’s investigation did not violate the “multiple hat
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110

Id.

- 36 -

rule” because he placed his findings in the record to give the applicant an opportunity to refute
them, and the applicant could not show that the board was biased by his investigation. 112
In a case where the HPRB testifies at the Mayor’s Agent hearing, there is even less
chance of a violation of the “multiple hat rule” because the HPRB’s findings are already on the
record. Indeed, the entire Mayor’s Agent hearing gives the applicant a chance to rebut the
HPRB’s findings, and as previously mentioned, there is little risk that the dual role would bias the
HPRB’s determinations below. In short, the HPRB may have the administrative standing to
intervene as a limited party in Mayor’s Agent proceedings and intervention would not legally
conflict the board. However, based on the positions of the interviewees, there appears to be little
consensus on whether limited intervention would be a good idea politic ally and what type of
limitations should be placed on the HPRB’s ability to intervene in Mayor’s Agent proceedings.

C. Even if the HPRB or the HPD Cannot Intervene, HPD Staff Can Testify as Witnesses,
Which May Have the Same Effect as Granting the HPRB Limited Party Status.
Under the regulations implementing the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, members of the
HPD may appear as witnesses in Mayor’s Agent hearings to represent the interests of the HPD
itself, the HPRB, or perhaps even the Office of Planning. Recent Mayor’s Agent decisions
refusing to allow HPD staff to testify in their official capacity about the historic property at issue
are at odds with the historic preservation regulations. The regulations state that in Mayor’s Agent
proceedings“[a]n officer or employee of a public agency or government unit or department may
represent that agency, unit or department.”113 But, “[a]ny person or party appearing before the
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Mayor other than on his or her own behalf may be required by the Mayor to establish his or her
authority to act in that capacity.”114
Members of an administrative agency testify in the hearings of other administrative
agencies frequently. 115 In the early 1990s, the HPD staff testified on behalf of the government in
at least five Mayor’s Agent hearings. 116 Only one of the decisions indicates that the HPD staff
members appeared at the Mayor’s Agent’s request. The others say nothing about how the HPD
came to testify at the hearing. Thus, these decisions suggest that HPD staff can testify before the
Mayor’s Agent if they can show authorization under § 2501.2 of the regulations. 117 Depending
on the limitations that the Mayor’s Agent would place on the HPRB as a limited party, allowing
the HPD to appear as a witness may accomplish the same result. If the HPRB is not allowed to
cross-examine witnesses, present rebuttal testimony, call additional witnesses, or exercise other
privileges that full parties usually have, the HPRB would be left with the same powers as any
witness.
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D. The HPRB Could Also M ake Its Expertise Available to the Mayor’s Agent by Ensuring
that the Mayor’s Agent Receives its Hearing Transcript or Written Opinion
One of the interviewees indicated that the Mayor’s Agent does not always receive the
HPRB’s entire hearing transcript. He may often receive only the small part of the transcript
where the HPRB issues its recommendation. The HPRB also does not issue any formal written
recommendation stating its findings. Recommendations of the HPRB do not receive the great
weight that ANC decisions receive, but the Mayor’s Agent does have to give the HPRB’s expert
recommendations some deference.118 Some of the cases reviewed for this paper indicate that the
Mayor’s Agent may not currently be giving the HPRB’s recommendations the deference merited
by the HPRB’s expertise. But, it is impossible to know how much of this problem is due to the
HPRB’s failure to make sufficient information supporting its recommendation available to the
Mayor’s Agent in written form. Ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent has the HPRB’s whole
transcript and/or written findings may present a non-controversial way for the HPRB increase the
deference the Mayor’s Agent gives to its recommendations.

Conclusion
The review of Mayor’s Agent decisions conducted for this paper suggests that recently
preservationists have not been able to attain party status in Mayor’s Agent proceedings as
frequently as they once did. Zealous representation of preservation viewpoints is crucial in
Mayor’s Agent hearings, particularly those involving sophisticated applicants represented by
counsel. When no one appears as a party in favor of preservation, the Mayor’s Agent may not
give proper consideration to the HPRB’s expertise and concerns. The absence of preservationists
as parties sometimes undermines the Mayor’s Agent’s ability to get at the truth because he is
presented with only one side of the story. Finally, without preservationists as parties in the
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Mayor’s Agent proceedings there is no chance that permit cases may settle in ways that address
the concerns of the preservation community while allowing for new development.
The HPRB or the HPD should take measures to fill the void left in the process when
preservationists do not appear as parties. The preservationists and D.C. government officials
interviewed for this paper unanimously agreed that neither entity should appear as a full party in
Mayor’s Agent proceedings. However, lesser alternatives like becoming a limited party,
appearing as a witness, and ensuring that the Mayor’s Agent receives the HPRB’s written views
are more politically and legally feasible. Any limitations on the HPRB or the HPD’s participation
in Mayor’s Agent proceedings must not be so great that they prevent the HPRB and the HPD
from remedying the current shortcomings in the process. Certainly, if the entities are not full
parties, then they may not be able to force a settlement. However, simply getting their views
before the Mayor’s Agent consistently in writing or in the form of live testimony may be enough
to ensure that their expertise and concerns are weighed in the process. These measures will also
significantly help the Mayor’s Agent in his truth-finding mission by allowing him to properly
evaluate the historic property that he will balance against the merits of the applicant’s proposal.
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